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Regulation FD: SEC Tells Corporate Insiders to 
“Chill Out” 
Jerry Duggan∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The investing community should prepare for a new Ice Age.1 On 
October 23, 2000, Regulation FD (Reg FD)2 went into effect,3 and its 
application is going to freeze the running rivers of information from 
corporations to the public.4 This result is not to say that Reg FD is the 
first securities regulation enacted either in the United States or 
abroad. It is just one of the latest securities regulations in a complex 
system that governs on the Federal, State, and Self Regulatory 
Organization (SRO) levels.5  
As early as 1776, when Thomas Jefferson put quill to parchment 
 
 ∗ J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002.  
 1. Not to be confused with any environmental disaster some politicians would have us 
believe is at hand. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992). 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000). 
 3. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 247, and 249). 
 4. Although the internet has made it possible for individuals to trade without assistance, 
market professionals are still a necessary piece in the capital markets puzzle. As of July 2001, 
5,571 firms with 87,765 branch offices and 683,241 registered representatives were registered 
with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). An increase in all but one of these 
categories occurred over the last year, at the end of which there were 5,579 member firms, 
82,726 branch offices, and 672,489 registered representatives, dispelling any theories that the 
internet made the stockbroker an anachronism. NASD Regulation Statistics, at http://www. 
nasdr.com /2380.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2001). 
 5. Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) are entities that have federal approval from the 
SEC to self-regulate under the umbrella of both federal disclosure laws and state merit-based 
regulation. The two most widely known SROs are the NASD and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Others are the American Stock Exchange, Boston Stock Exchange, Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, International Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, 
NASDR (formerly part of NASD), Pacific Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board, Depository Trust Company, Mortgage Backed Securities 
Clearing Corporation, National Securities Clearing Corporation, and Options Clearing 
Corporation. See generally http://www.sec.gov/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).  
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and Adam Smith published Wealth of Nations,6 a long tradition of 
Anglo-American securities regulation existed.7 American capitalists 
 
 6. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Claredon Press 1976) (1776).  
 7. In 1696, the English Parliament passed a law prohibiting stock price manipulation 
commenting: 
The pernicious Art of Stock-Jobbing hath, of late, so wholly perverted the End and 
Design of Companies and Corporations, erected for the introducing, or carrying on, of 
Manufactures to be the Private Profit of the first Projectors, that the Privileges granted 
to them have, commonly, been made no other Use of, by the first Procurers and 
Subscribers, but to sell again, with Advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the 
Reputation falsely raised, and artfully spread, concerning the thriving State of their 
Stock. 
11 H.C.J. 595 (1696), reprinted in 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 
3-4 (3d ed. 1989). 
 Although securities regulation developed in England as early as the seventheenth century, 
securities were not traded in North America on a large scale until the mid-eighteenth century. 
STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 122 (1998). During the 
American Revolution, food shortages allowed for speculation; however, nothing was really 
done about it. “One early nineteenth-century commentator, looking back on the preceding 
century, observed that although forestalling, engrossing, and regrating had always been 
common law crimes in North America, ‘notorious violations have often been complained of, 
but scarcely in any instances prosecuted.’” Id. at 123. 
 Although the United States did not regulate the sale of securities or speculation in general 
during its early years, it did have the same cultural condemnation of speculation and gambling 
as in England. Id. at 125. Merchants who did nothing but make internal sales that did not 
involve any outside economy were looked upon as leaches that only increased internal costs at 
the expense of the consumer: 
Eighteenth century Americans also inherited the prevailing English conception of the 
economy, according to which the national wealth was increased only by the production 
and by selling goods abroad, not by internal trade. The merchants who bought and sold 
in domestic markets were thus understood to contribute nothing to the public good.  
Id. at 124. While economists and politicians reflected this rhetoric, the colonial legislatures 
were mostly silent. In fact, the Massachusetts colonial legislature repealed two English anti-
speculation statutes they adopted earlier in the seventeenth century. Id. at 126-27. 
 The United States may have been a late bloomer as far as comprehensive, formal securities 
regulation, but Americans have always had a general suspicion of those who profit at the 
expense of others. Id. at 175. William Smith stated: 
What useful Art is promoted? What Manufactures are carried on? Or what Addition is 
there made by it top the public Stock and Wealth of a People? None certainly. For the 
Whole of Gaming is only to shift the Property and Specie, which hath been acquired to 
a Country and brought in by the honest Labourer’s Industry, from one Hand to 
another. 
WILLIAM SMITH, THE SINFULNESS AND PERNICIOUS NATURE OF GAMING 13 (1752), reprinted 
in BANNER, supra, at 125. Another commenter said this of stockjobbers: 
A set of sharks, that flouncing in the flood, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/10
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have betrayed Smith’s “invisible hand,”8 by developing and codifying 
regulations, principally in the twentieth century with the 1933 
Securities Act,9 its cousin, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,10 and 
the various state securities statutes known as “blue sky” laws.11 Reg 
FD purportedly furthers the goals of the Federal securities laws, 
which seek to maintain competitive and fair markets through the free 
flow of all information regarding all publicly traded corporations.12 
The need to target selective disclosure by regulation is closely 
related to the recent increase in individual investing in public 
 
Suppose all kind of fish their proper food: 
A set of hawks, that flying in the air, 
Of harmless birds make up their bill of fare: 
A set of wolves, that prowling ‘bout for prey, 
All animals devour that cross their way. 
Id. at 147-48. 
 This attitude, combined with the expansion of the American economy in the mid-
nineteenth century, necessitated a departure from laissez-faire economics and a measure of 
regulation. See id. at 222-49. 
 8. SMITH, supra note 6, at 456. Smith stated in full: 
By preferring the support of domestick [sic] to that of foreign industry, he intends only 
his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be 
of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the publick [sic] good. 
Id. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). 
 11. Not surprisingly, the phrase “blue sky” came from the hotbed of securities trading in 
the Midwest: Kansas. In the Kansas State legislature, during discussion of the first major merit-
based securities regulation of securities and those who sold them, a congressman stood up and 
stated there were crooks who “‘would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple.’” LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 27. 
 Although every State securities statute varies in many details, most have adopted some 
variation on the Uniform Securities Act, first passed in 1956: 
With 36 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico having adopted or 
substantially adopted the 1956 Uniform Securities Act, there is a great deal more 
uniformity in state securities regulation that there was before the 1956 Act. Before that 
Act, no two state securities statutes came close to being identical.  
Id. at 40. Since State securities regulations are not affected or augmented by Reg FD, this quote 
will be the extent of the discussion. 
 12. See infra note 45.  
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markets. Often, individuals are trading either on their own research 
through brokers or on internet trading sites with proprietary research. 
These unsophisticated investors are the victims of selective disclosure 
because information is usually selectively disclosed to market 
professionals. The professionals can trade on information before it 
becomes publicly available to these dilettante investors. Thus far, 
insider trading laws have constituted the regulation of selective 
disclosure.13 These laws, however, only touch the demand factor of 
the equation rather than the supply factor. Reg FD is a supply-side 
regulation that allows for administrative enforcement action by the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).14  
According to a divided SEC,15 this regulation is a natural 
complement to the existing insider trading rules because it punishes 
the tipper in all situations, regardless of whether the tippee trades on 
the provided information.16 With every periodic disclosure regulation, 
however, the SEC walks the fine line between creating an even 
playing field by allowing equal access to material information and 
stifling the information output due to corporate insiders fear of 
prosecution. Thus far, the SEC has been successful in regulating 
material information disclosure because insiders have known the 
clear lines they could not cross. This Note proposes that Reg FD has 
greatly blurred those lines to the detriment of the entire securities 
industry. 
Part I of this Note describes selective disclosure and the history of 
securities regulation to date. It focuses primarily on federal insider 
trading rules under the 1934 Act because those rules constituted the 
sole deterrent to selective disclosure prior to Reg FD. Part I 
concludes by explaining, in full, the specific provisions of Reg FD.  
Part II of this Note analyzes exactly why Reg FD will do more 
harm than good. This Note explains why Reg FD will create a freeze 
on information, and why, in a practical sense, analysts and large 
institutional investors will still have access to material nonpublic 
 
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1089 (Aug. 14, 2000); see infra note 86.  
 16. See infra Part I.C. 
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information. Lastly, Part III of this Note delineates what the SEC 
should have enacted in place of Reg FD. 
I. BEFORE THE FREEZE: THE HISTORY OF SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE 
AND RELEVANT SECURITY REGULATIONS 
A. Selective Disclosure, Then and Now 
Before explaining the pertinent securities regulations, it is 
necessary to understand the target of Reg FD, selective disclosure. 
Simply, when a corporate insider, such as a director or an officer, 
gives nonpublic information to an individual, he selectively disclosed 
that information. Of course, not all selective disclosure of 
information is damaging. Rather, the information must be material.17 
Material information is any information that an investor would 
consider important when deciding whether to buy or to sell a 
security.18 
In 1929, the United States was nearing the end of more than a 
decade of uninterrupted prosperity and peace. Unlike today, however, 
common Americans invested in a largely unregulated New York 
Stock Exchange.19 In September of that year, the market began a 
 
 17. Due to the infinite wisdom of the SEC, Reg FD only covers “material nonpublic 
information.” 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2001).  
 18. In Reg FD, information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in the purchase or sale of a security. 17 
C.F.R. § 243.100 (2001). This definition is the identical definition of materiality as used in Rule 
10b-5 fraud cases. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  
 19. “By the 1820s, the New York Stock and Exchange Board encompassed a miniature 
private legal system, which formulated rules governing the market and resolved disputes 
involving members.” BANNER, supra note 7, at 250. The foxes ran the chicken coup.  
 The main function of the Board was the compilation of member credit information and the 
matching of buyers and sellers. Id. at 258-61. This merit-based regulation only extended to the 
stocks traded by Board members. Id. at 264-66. Any sanctions by the Board were few and far 
between since it was such a close-knit family: 
The greatest punishment the Board could impose was the suspension or expulsion of 
members, but this power could of course be exercised only over members, and the 
number of members was never very large. From the perspective of any given member, 
therefore, the number of potential trading partners provided by the Board’s ability to 
expel defaulters was a small one. At a time when the Board consisted of fifty brokers, 
for instance, it may have been possible for any one of the brokers to know each of the 
other forty-nine personally. If so, the Board’s enforcement mechanism may not have 
provided him with much additional security.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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downward spiral that did not stop until 1932 and fueled the Great 
Depression.20 Congressional hearings ensued over the causes of the 
market’s decline and possible remedies to forestall its recurrence; 
selective disclosure was one of the hot topics.21  
In the pre-federal regulation days, selective disclosure took an 
almost incestual form.22 Large investment banking houses such as 
 
Id. at 263-64. Even in the depths of the Depression, President Herbert Hoover was still reluctant 
to regulate federally the securities market. In response to statements made by then Governor 
Roosevelt, he stated, “‘The Governor does not inform the American people that there is no 
Federal law of regulation of the sale of securities and that there is doubtful constitutional 
authority for such a law; . . . New York State . . . has such authority.’” JOEL SELIGMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 18-19 (1995).  
 20. The market devastation was unprecedented: 
Between September 1, 1929, and July 1, 1932, the value of all stocks listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange shrank from a total of nearly $90 billion to just under $16 
billion–a loss of 83 percent. In a comparable period, bonds listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange declined from a value of $49 billion to $31 billion. “The annals of 
finance,” the Senate Banking Committee would write, “present no counterpart to this 
enormous decline in security prices.” Nor did these figures, staggering as they were, 
fully gauge the extent of the 1929-1932 stock market crash. During the post-World 
War I decade, approximately $50 billion of new securities were sold in the United 
States. Approximately half or $25 billion would prove near or totally valueless. 
Leading “blue chip” securities, including General Electric, Sears, Roebuck, and U.S. 
Steel common stock, would lose over 90 percent of their value . . . .  
Id. at 1-2.  
 21. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency made pre-regulation findings on 
defects in the securities markets. S. REP. NO. 73-1455 (1934) reprinted in COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING AND CURRENCY, 72ND CONG., S. Res. 84 (1934). In its report, the Committee found 
that the deficiencies in information flow were not just due to lack of reporting of periodic 
information, but also because the Exchanges did not require material information in the listing 
documents. “Although the New York Stock Exchange has proclaimed the searching nature of 
its listing requirements, evidence was adduced before the subcommittee establishing that the 
exchange authorities were lax in their investigation of listing applications.” Id. at 70. 
 Not only were listed companies lax in reporting, but the unlisted companies had no 
reporting requirements at all. This lack of reporting allowed corporate insiders and the 
investment houses involved with them to horde information. These unlisted securities 
represented the majority of traded securities on the market and compounded the reporting 
deficiencies: 
On December 31, 1933, 355 stocks and 19 bonds were ‘listed’ on the New York Curb 
Exchange as compared with 1,069 stocks and 620 bonds in the ‘unlisted department.’ 
As of November 23, 1933, 82 percent of all the securities traded on the New York 
Curb Exchange were in the ‘unlisted’ department. The value of the ‘unlisted’ securities 
was . . . approximately $17,000,000.00. 
Id. at 90-113. Additionally, the investment bankers played a heavy role in keeping information 
from the public, instead trading on the accounts of preferred clientele. Id.  
 22. The report states: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/10
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J.P. Morgan & Co.23 and National City, Co.24 had close ties to the 
publicly traded corporations on the New York Stock Exchange.25 
 
The partners of J.P. Morgan & Co. and Drexel & Co. held 126 directorships and 
trusteeships in 89 companies, excluding subsidiaries, with $19,929,396,475.39 total 
resources for 75 of these companies. These directorships included 20 directorships on 
15 banks and trusts companies . . .; 14 directorships on 7 miscellaneous holding 
companies . . .; 9 directorships on 5 utility holding companies . . .; 10 directorships on 
8 utility operating companies . . .; 12 directorships on 10 railroad companies . . .; 55 
directorships on 38 industrial companies . . .; and 6 directorships on 6 insurance 
companies . . . .  
Id. at 385-86. 
 23. Perhaps the biggest coup during the Congressional hearings was the testimony of J.P. 
Morgan, head of the then “largest private banking house in the world.” Id. at 84. 
 24. National City Co., the investment banking subsidiary of the National City Bank of 
New York, was involved in one of the largest scams causing the downfall of the market: the 
Peruvian foreign bond scam. This scam is one of the most blatant abuses of selective disclosure 
to this day. In this case, the investment bankers who issued the debt securities possessed 
knowledge that was not transmitted to the public in the offering prospectus.  
 Before the majority of the $65,000,000 in bonds had been offered to the public and quickly 
absorbed, an almost humorous memo was sent to Charles Mitchell from J.H. Durell, the vice 
president and overseas manager of the bank. None of the pathetic financial statistics contained 
in the letter were reflected in the prospectus. The prospectus only stated, “The Republic of Peru 
is the third largest country in South America, with an area of approximately 550,000 square 
miles. It has a population estimated at 6,000,000.” Id. at 129. Notice there is no mention of the 
fact that Peru had paid nearly none of its foreign obligations, had a struggling economy, and 
could not balance its budget! Id. at 126-29.  
 After the final issue of the series, the total sale valued $90 million. At roughly the same 
time as the issue, another internal memo stated that the “[e]conomic conditions of the country 
leave considerable [sic] to be desired. The last cotton crop was a short one on account of lack of 
water for proper irrigation.” Id. at 131. In the end, the Peruvian government defaulted on all 
three issues, which, initially valued at over $90 per bond, traded at under $5 by the time of the 
hearings. Id. 
 25. Congress stated, “A prolific source of evil has been the affiliated investment 
companies of large commercial banks.” Id. at 113. These large banking houses, J.P. Morgan, 
Kuhn, Loeb & Co., and National City, had the ability to spin off bad securities on commercial 
investors, thereby making almost all of their undertakings fool proof. Additionally, they were 
the source of all large-scale credit and investment, making themselves indispensable to large 
corporations. 
 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. had particularly close ties to the rail industry, and not coincidentally, 
many of its “preferred clients” were directors and officers of those same railroads: 
Mr. Pecora [counsel for the subcommittee]. I would say in casually glancing over this 
list that a large number if not a majority of the names appearing thereon are the names 
of men who were executive officers of various railroad corporations. 
Mr. Kahn. Railroad and other corporations; yes. 
Mr. Pecora. And most of the railroad corporations with which these men were 
affiliated are railroad corporations for which your firm did financing, are they not? 
Mr. Kahn. Yes. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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These large banks had access to material nonpublic information 
because they had huge leverage on the corporations due to their 
control on credit. In this tight-knit family, the large brokerage houses 
gathered information before it filtered down to the public. Investment 
banks then used this information to trade on the accounts of preferred 
stockholders, which included powerful politicians, entertainers, and 
even sports heroes.26 In the securities industry, information is power, 
and those with the information have never been particularly 
 
Mr. Pecora. Did your firm handle issues that found their way into the portfolio of large 
insurance companies? 
Mr. Kahn. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Pecora. I notice among the names on this list that of Mr. F.H. Ecker, president and 
director of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 
Mr. Kahn. Yes. 
Mr. Pecora. That is one of the largest insurance companies in the country, isn’t it? 
Mr. Kahn. It is; yes. 
Mr. Pecora. If not in the world? 
Mr. Kahn. Yes. 
Mr. Pecora. And has perhaps the largest cash resources of the entire country? 
Mr. Kahn. I think so. 
Mr. Pecora. And hence is the largest potential buyer of railroad bonds? 
Mr. Kahn. I think so. 
Id. at 106. 
 26. Note that the idea of “fair disclosure” is to level the playing field, and allow any 
diligent investor to be on even footing. The preferred lists of the investment banking houses 
were the most blatant violation “fair disclosure.” Not only were the most powerful financial 
magnates controlling the information, but they also used it to trade for huge profits on the 
accounts of the most well-known and respected people in the United States. Id. at 101. 
 With respect to J.P. Morgan, Congress examined the sale of Allegheny Corporation stock. 
It was offered to a group of preferred investors at cost, $20 per share. The Chairman of the 
National Democratic Committee, John J. Raskob, brought 2,000 shares and others are as 
follows: 
Joseph Nutt, treasurer of the Republican National Committee- 3,000 shares; Charles 
Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy- 1,000 shares; Edmund Machold, speaker of the 
Assembly of the State of New York and State chairman of the Republican Party in 
New York State- 2,000 shares; Silas H. Strawn, president of the United States 
Chamber of Commerce and president of the American Bar Association- 1,000 shares; 
William Woodin, president of American Car and Foundry Co. and later Secretary of 
the Treasury- 1,000 shares. 
Id. at 102. These individuals made a profit of over $37 per share in five months. Id. at 103. A 
second offering made to the preferred list included the personal broker for Calvin Coolidge and 
Bernard Baruch. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/10
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interested in giving it to those without. Of course, this situation put 
the general public at an incredible disadvantage and greatly 
contributed to the market’s crash.  
Today, selective disclosure is much more insidious. No longer can 
the common investor point to the tycoon on the block such as J.P. 
Morgan.27 Due to the decentralized structure of the securities 
markets,28 selective disclosure pervades every region of the United 
States and every facet of those markets.29 Computer technology and 
the internet facilitated much of this change, exposing the common 
investor more than ever to the markets’ vicissitude.30  
 
 27. See NASD Regulations Statistics, supra note 4. 
 28. Now literally anyone with a computer and some cash in his pocket can invest over the 
internet: 
The Internet offers virtually instantaneous, worldwide access to millions of users and 
has radically transformed the securities industry. Individual, retail investors now can 
obtain real time market information, trade at low cost using an online brokerage, and 
have access to information that previously was available only to industry professionals 
and money managers. Moreover, investors are now more involved in the everyday 
management of their accounts than ever before. 
Robert B. Robbins, Regulation of Online Securities Transactions, in SECURITIES LAW FOR 
NONSECURITIES LAWYERS, SE62 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 445, 447 (June 1, 2000). 
 29. A major vehicle of selective disclosure is the conference call. Corporate directors 
sponsor these calls and historically invite only institutional investors and analysts to participate: 
A 1998 study by the National Investors Relations Institute (NIRI) noted that 83% of 
NIRI companies conduct analyst conference calls. Moreover, a 1999 survey by the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) found that 95% of 
polled financial analysts and portfolio managers regarded conference calls as the most 
informative of technology-aided communications, outstripping even company 
websites. 
. . . According to the NIRI study, which surveyed 268 companies that solicited 
participation in their conference calls, 99% invited buy-side analysts and 94% invited 
institutional shareholders, while only 29% invited individual shareholders and a mere 
14% invited the media. As of March 1999, only 3% of NIRI-identified companies 
made transcripts of conference calls available to the public. 
Daniel J. Kramer, Speaking to the Market Under Sec’s Proposed Rules, at http://www. 
srz.com/pubtemplate.asp?id=112 (last visited Aug. 31, 2001). 
 The significance of these statistics is evident considering over 5,600 firms and 665,000 
representatives are registered with the NASD. See NASD Regulations Statistics, supra note 4. 
Literally tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of market professionals are engaged in conference 
calls tailored specifically to the few analysts that follow a particular  security. Id. This practice 
excludes the multitude of investors. 
 30. The Securities Industry Association (SIA) surveyed American securities firms in order 
to see exactly the magnitude and importance of the internet in the expansion of the securities 
markets. SIA found that “North American securities firms spent more than US$11 billion on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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For instance, suppose Jim is an analyst in Kansas that follows 
XYZ Corporation, a small regional corporation traded on the Over 
the Counter Bulletin Board. Jim is the only analyst that follows XYZ, 
and therefore the investing public relies solely upon his research 
report. The chief financial officer (CFO) of XYZ has lunch with Jim 
at a burger joint in Hays, Kansas. Jim asks how quarterly earnings 
look. The CFO smiles and nods. That response is selective disclosure. 
No longer is it necessarily J.P. Morgan and Henry Ford discussing 
earnings reports.31  
The SEC and the individual investor present three major 
arguments against selective disclosure. First, selective disclosure, 
much like insider trading, works against individual retail investors. 
Second, not only does it injure investors already in the market, but 
also it deters prospective investors from participating in purportedly 
“free markets.” Third, selective disclosure “aids and abets” in the 
conversion of corporate information into a commodity, and allows 
 
technology in 1996.” SIA, Technology Trends in the Securities Industry: Spending, Strategies, 
Challenges, & Change–1999, at http://www.sia.com/ surveys/html/ tech_ trends_sample.html 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2001).  
 Unfortunately, widespread access to information over the internet also invites fraud and 
especially targets the unsophisticated investor. Robert B. Robbins of Shaw Pittman in 
Washington D.C. writes: 
In general, the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . has welcomed the Internet as 
a positive development that enables the Commission to better achieve its goals of 
increasing market transparency and increasing investor access to information. 
However, the Commission has expressed concern that the tremendous proliferation of 
information and increased participation in the securities markets increases the 
opportunity for securities fraud. 
Robbins, supra note 28, at 447. 
 31. Necessarily is the key term. Generally, the greatest culprit of possible selective 
disclosure are widely traded large firms, usually tracked by the largest securities firms. See 
generally Bethany McLean, You’re Not Invited, FORTUNE, Apr. 26, 1999, at 464 (analyzing 
recent blatant examples of selective disclosure including Northern Telecom and Compaq. She 
writes, “In late February a group of big investors paid a visit to Compaq’s Houston 
headquarters, where the CFO acknowledged that yes, there was some softness in the PC 
industry. The next day the stock crashed 14%--no doubt puzzling the investors who weren’t 
there.”); Paul Commins, Selective Disclosure Exposed at EDS, at http://wwww.fool.com/ 
news/2000/foth000615.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (explaining the selective disclosure of 
EDS earnings reports to Merrill Lynch analyst Stephen McClellan); What is “Selective 
Disclosure?” Why Do Some Firms Play Favorites in Revealing News?, at http://www. 
thehamptonreport.com/selectve_disclosure.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (outlining selective 
disclosure by insiders of Clorox Co., Wal-Mart Stores, Apple Computer, and Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co.). 
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corporations to exercise significant control over analysts. 
Primarily, selective disclosure theoretically works against the 
common investor by granting a monopoly to research analysts and 
institutional investors on corporate information.32 With this 
information, common sense dictates that traders will trade to the 
benefit of their customers and to the detriment of lay people.33 Thus, 
in many situations, selective disclosure is an essential counterpart to 
insider trading. Another side effect of this unfairness is the loss of 
investor confidence in the fairness of the markets, thereby causing a 
withdrawal of capital from the market, and overall market 
contraction.34 
 
 32. In their primer for Regulation FD, 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, James Hamilton and Ted 
Trautmann write: 
The SEC had become increasingly concerned about the corporate community’s 
selective disclosure of material information. As reflected in publicized reports, many 
companies were disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance 
warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or 
both, before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public.  
JAMES HAMILTON, J.D., LL.M. & TED TRAUTMANN, J.D., FAIR DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER 
TRADING REFORMS: REGULATION FD, RULE 10B5-1 AND RULE 10B5-2 (CCH) ¶ 101, at 7 
(2000). 
 33. The SEC, in the adoption release stated: 
As reflected in recent publicized reports, many issuers are disclosing important 
nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities 
analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the 
same information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were 
privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the 
expense of those kept in the dark. 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket 
(CCH) at 3 (Aug. 15, 2000). Therefore, allowance of selective disclosure can be perceived as a 
loophole in the general prohibition against insider trading. See Paul B. Brountas Jr., Note: Rule 
10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 
1529 (1992). 
 34. Again, the SEC states: 
. . . [T]he practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the 
integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security’s price change 
dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that 
move rightly question whether they are in a level playing field with market insiders.  
. . . [I]nvestors lose confidence in the fairness of the markets when they know that 
other participants may exploit “unerodable informational advantages” derived not from 
hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate insiders.  
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket 
(CCH) at 3-4 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
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For example, in response to the proposal release for Reg FD,35 the 
Commission received nearly 6,000 comment letters, most from 
individual investors applauding the regulation.36 One investor 
exemplified the retail investor’s position, writing, “Yes!!!! Please 
level the playing field for the little guy.”37 Additionally, the North 
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an 
organization that represents the various state securities 
commissioners by advocating and developing both state and federal 
regulations, heralds Reg FD as a victory for the individual investor.38  
This perceived inherent unfairness leads not only to investor 
suspicion, but also to nonparticipation in the market by possible 
investors.39 Constant influx of capital is the lifeblood of the market; 
hence, it is necessary to entice new people into the market. People are 
more willing to gamble their money when ensured they are on a level 
playing field with professional investors.40 Many regulators, 
 
 35. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, 71 SEC 
Docket (CCH) at 732 (Jan. 31, 2000). The SEC solicits comments in its proposal releases in 
order to amend and focus proposals before adoption. Id. 
 36. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC 
Docket (CCH) at 4 (Aug. 15, 2000).  
 37. Comment Letter of Michael Fulara to SEC website, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s73199/fulara1.txt (last visited Aug. 31, 2001). Mr. Fulara goes on to explain: 
Pursue this new rule with all your passion. For years I have been frustrated at seeing an 
analyst was given proprietary company information that was selectively distributed to 
their client base, causing a significant move in a stock. As recent as this week, a stock 
I own declined significantly for no known reason. Since the decline I found out that an 
analyst cut their earnings estimate on the company SIGNIFICANTLY for the current 
quarter. There were no public indications that anything had changed at the company. 
About a week after the analyst’s downgrade, the company announced that quarterly 
earnings would [sic] effected by accounting problems. . .. Give ‘em hell guys!  
Id. 
 38. Comment Letter of Bradley W. Skolnik on behalf of the North American Securities 
Administrator Association to SEC website, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/ 
skolnik1.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2001). Mr. Skolnik writes, “In today’s fast-moving and 
Internet-driven economy, it is important to level the playing field between the investing public 
and those who have traditionally been privy to and gatekeepers for material nonpublic 
information regarding publicly traded companies.” Id. 
 39. “The investing public has a legitimate expectation that the prices of actively traded 
securities reflect publicly available information about the issuer of such securities . . . . [T]he 
small investor will be—and has been—reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it is rigged 
against him.” Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 
SEC Docket (CCH) at 4 n.6 (Aug. 15, 2000)  (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-910 (1988)).  
 40. See Skolnik, supra at note 38. 
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including former SEC Chairman Levitt, consider this an important 
requirement for the future of the federal securities markets.41 
Lastly, allowing corporate directors to control the information 
supply converts information from a free good into a commodity.42 
The SEC is particularly concerned with this possibility because 
commodifying information leads to exclusion in the dispersion of 
information and perpetuates and effectively magnifies selective 
disclosure.43 As soon as information becomes a commodity, 
corporations possess leverage to grant access to information to only 
those who will post positive reports and possibly hide negative 
information.44 This reaction not only creates more stratified access to 
information, but also breeds the possibility of fraud.  
B. Present Relevant Federal Regulations  
In response to a 1934 mandate from President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt,45 the U.S. Congress began the process of supplementing 
 
 41. “‘High quality and timely information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets,’ 
Levitt declared . . .. He predicted that Regulation FD will bring all investors, regardless of their 
holdings, ‘into the information loop . . . where they belong. To all of America’s investors, it’s 
well past time to say, ‘Welcome to the neighborhood.’” Selective Disclosure Rule Gains 
Approval by Divided SEC, supra note 15. 
 42. “Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our 
markets: the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity 
to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors.” Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket CCH at 3 (Aug. 15, 
2000).  
 43. The SEC is “concerned, in this regard, with reports that analysts who publish negative 
views of an issuer are sometimes excluded by that issuer from calls and meetings to which other 
analysts are invited.” Id. 
 44. “In the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to 
report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued 
access to selectively disclosed information.” Id.  
 45. F.D.R. wrote on February 9, 1934: 
In my message to you last March proposing legislation for Federal supervision of 
national traffic in investment securities I said: ‘This is but one step in our broad 
purpose of protecting investors and depositors. It should be followed by legislation 
relating to the better supervision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt with on 
exchanges.’ 
 This Congress has performed a useful service in regulating the investment business 
on the part of financial houses and in protecting the investing public in its acquisition 
of securities. 
 There remains the fact, however, that outside the field of legitimate investment, 
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the existing Securities Act of 193346 with the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.47 These two legislative directives complement each 
other. The 1933 Act regulates the distribution of securities,48 while 
the 1934 Act regulates the secondary trading of securities through the 
exchanges.49 While both Acts preclude disclosure, the 1934 Act, 
more specifically, § 1050 and corresponding Rule 10b-5,51 the 
 
naked speculation has been made far too alluring and far too easy for those who could 
and for those who could not afford to gamble. 
 Such speculation has run the scale from the individual who has risked his pay 
envelop [sic] or his meager savings on margin transaction[s] involving stocks with 
whose true value he was wholly unfamiliar, to the pool of individuals or corporations 
with large resources, often not their own, which sought by manipulation to raise or 
depress market quotations far out of line with reason, all of this resulting in loss to the 
average investor, who is of necessity personally uninformed. 
 . . . It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in securities and commodities are 
necessary and of definite value to our commercial and agricultural life. Nevertheless, it 
should be our national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of the exchanges for 
purely speculative operations. 
 I, therefore, recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation providing for 
the regulation by the Federal Government of the operations of exchanges dealing in 
securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of 
values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, 
and destructive speculation. 
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383 (Apr. 27, 1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 7701, 7702 (1934). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934). 
 48. Every distribution of securities, if not subject to an exemption, must be registered 
according to § 5 of the 1933 Act: 
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for 
any person, directly or indirectly-  
 (1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such a security through the use or medium 
of any prospectus or otherwise; or 
 (2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by 
any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or 
for delivery after sale. 
15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933). 
 49. The preface of the Securities Exchange Bill of 1934 states:  
The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 9323) to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-
counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and trough the mails, to 
prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets . . . .  
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383 (Apr. 27, 1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 7701 (1934).  
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934).  
 51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951). 
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Exchange Act’s general anti-fraud provision, particularly prohibit 
selective disclosure.52  
Although it seems at first blush that § 1653 of the 1934 Act covers 
insider trading, this assumption is in fact incorrect.54 Due to judicial 
creation, Rule 10b-5 promulgated under § 10 of the Act has become 
one of the most important features of federal securities regulation 
and, before Reg FD, the only deterrent to selective disclosure. 
Federal insider trading regulations attempt to regulate the demand 
of material nonpublic information by prohibiting trading on the 
information. This attempt, however, is unclear in the language of 
§ 10(b), which simply prohibits the use of any “manipulative or 
deceptive device.”55 Nor does Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, 
 
 52. The 1933 Act regulates selective disclosure only during the initial distribution of the 
security by regulating the types of communications allowed before the initial distribution. 
“Before the actual distribution period, the only communication used is the prospectus made in 
accordance with section 10 of the 1933 Act or a ‘red herring’ prospectus allowed before the 
distribution period begins. The prospectus is one of various types of registration statements 
available under the Act and mandated under section 6 of the Act.”  
 The 1933 Act’s disclosure provisions will not be discussed in this Note, because the SEC 
stated that it will not interfere with the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act. Specifically, 
the SEC stated: 
In response to concerns about the interplay of Regulation FD with the Securities Act 
disclosure regime, we have expressly excluded from the scope of the regulation 
communications made in connection with most securities offerings registered under 
the Securities Act. We believe that the Securities Act already accomplishes most of the 
policy goals of Regulation FD for purposes of registered offerings . . . .  
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket 
(CCH) at 7 (Aug. 15, 2001). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1934). 
 54. Section 16(b) states: 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been 
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and 
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any periods of less than six 
months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt 
previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of 
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into 
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security 
sold for a period of six months. 
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
 55. In full: 
Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
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state anything about insider trading or the use of material nonpublic 
information.56 An extensive base of case law, however, turned 10b-5 
into the de facto anti-fraud rule of the Securities Exchange Act. In In 
re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,57 the Court connected 
fraud and insider trading: “[I]nherent unfairness [is] involved where 
one takes advantage” of “information intended to be available only 
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”58 
In Dirks v. SEC,59 the Supreme Court decided the prototypical 
case involving selective disclosure of material nonpublic information 
by a former officer to a securities analyst.60 The Court first repeated 
the insider trading requirement developed in a previous case, United 
 
national securities exchange- 
 (a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with 
the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities exchange, in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
 (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 56. Rule 10b-5 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
 (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (2) to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 57. 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). 
 58. Id. at 936. 
 59. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 60. Defendant was an officer at a New York brokerage house, and he received 
information from a former officer of an insurance company outlining the insurance company’s 
undisclosed fraud. Defendant investigated the claims and found that there was a possibility that 
the fraud was being committed. Id. at 648-49. 
 In the course of his investigation, he discussed the company with a number of clients and 
investors who dumped the stock after hearing of the fraud. Five investment advisers, the 
defendant’s colleagues, sold over $16 million of the security. Id. at 649. 
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States v. Chiarella,61 that the offender breached a fiduciary duty. The 
Court held that Raymond Dirks’ actions did not in fact violate Rule 
10b-562 because he neither breached a fiduciary duty nor did his 
actions involve a manipulation or deception.63  
The classical tipper-tippee relationship is not the only theory of 
liability under Rule 10b-5. In United States v. O’Hagan,64 the Court 
enunciated the “misappropriation theory,” holding that liability for 
insider trading must involve a deception at the source.65 The SEC  
 
 61. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 62. A former employee of Equity Funding of America informed Mr. Dirks that the 
corporation may be fraudulently overstating its assets. While investigating the matter, Dirks 
discussed the issue with other brokers and clients who consequently traded on the information, 
which later turned out to be true. Neither Dirks nor his employer traded in the security of Equity 
Funding. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648-49.  
 63. The SEC failed to establish that Dirks was a fiduciary of the shareholders. Justice 
Powell commented: 
This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual 
trading on inside information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC and courts 
in policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have 
independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 
tippee has no such relationships.  
Id. at 655. Justice Powell concluded: 
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to 
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the 
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.  
Id. at 660 (emphasis added).  
 The Court states that outsiders such as Dirks may become insiders in certain circumstances 
and implicitly accept the according fiduciary duty. “When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee.” Id. at 655 n.14. This 
rule alleviates the problem of proving the duty of loyalty and the knowledge of the 
inappropriateness of trading on the information. 
 64. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 65. Justice Ginsburg writes: 
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” 
a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information . . . . Under this theory, a fiduciary’s 
undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, 
in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the 
exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary 
relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, 
the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception 
of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information. 
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also addressed concerns about the ambiguity of who owes a duty of 
confidentiality66 and whether mere possession of material nonpublic 
information at the time of trading suffices as insider trading.67 The 
regulations promulgated under § 10 constantly evolve to regulate the 
demand for insider information,68 and Reg FD, which seeks to limit 
the supply of material nonpublic information, is a natural 
compliment. 
C. Reg FD 
Reg FD comprehensively restricts selective disclosure of material 
nonpublic information by issuers.69 If the issuer intentionally70 
selectively discloses material nonpublic information, he must 
publicly disclose the information “simultaneously”;71 if the selective 
disclosure is unintentional, the consequent public disclosure must be 
made “promptly”72 to avoid a violation.73 To satisfy “public 
 
Id. at 652.  
 66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000). Rule 10b5-2 responds to the ambiguity of “duty of 
trust or confidence” under O’Hagan. 
 67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2001). This Rule officially ends the possession versus use 
debate for inside information following the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 
(11th Cir. 1998). 
 68. For a discussion of the insider trading regime after O’Hagan, see Roberta S. Karmel, 
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information–A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZA L. 
REV. 83 (Sept. 1998). 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2001). The crux of Reg FD states: 
§ 243.100 General rule regarding selective disclosure 
 (a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material 
nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any person described in 
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make public disclosure of that 
information as provided in § 243.101(e) . . .. 
Id. 
 70. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) states, “A selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information is ‘intentional’ when the person making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless 
in not knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and 
nonpublic.” 
 71. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1).  
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d). 
“Promptly” means as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 
24 hours or the commencement of the next day’s trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-end 
investment company, a senior official of the issuer’s investment adviser) learns that 
there has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on behalf of 
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disclosure,” the issuer may either file a Form 8-K with the SEC74 or 
disseminate “the information through another method (or 
combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to 
provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the 
public.”75 
Reg FD applies to disclosures of information to broker-dealers 
(and associates thereof),76 investment advisers or institutional 
investment advisers (and associates thereof),77 investment companies 
(and affiliated persons),78 and owners of the issuer’s securities, 
“under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
person will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the 
information.”79 Highlighting the symbiotic nature of Reg FD and 
Rule 10b-5, the regulation expressly states that it does not apply to 
communications made to those bound by a “duty of trust or 
confidence to the issuer”80 or to those who expressly agree to 
maintain confidentiality.81  
Much like Rule 10b-5, Reg FD fails to mention causes of action. 
The SEC has made it quite clear that it does not intend for there to be 
 
the issuer of information that the senior official knows, or is reckless in not knowing, 
is both material and nonpublic. 
Id. 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(2). 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(1). 
 75. Id. § 243.101(e)(2). In the adoption release, the SEC offered a myriad of disclosure 
procedures that together would satisfy the alternate disclosure standard: 
First, issue a press release, distributed through regular channels, containing the 
information; 
 Second, provide adequate notice, by a press release and/or website posting, of a 
scheduled conference call to discuss the announced results, giving investors both the 
time and date of the conference call, and instructions on how to access the call; and 
 Third, hold the conference call in an open manner, permitting investors to listen in 
either by telephonic means or through Internet webcasting. 
Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket (CCH) at 14 (Aug. 
15, 2001). 
 76. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i). 
 77. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii). 
 78. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii). 
 79. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv). 
 80. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(i). 
 81. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii). 
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a private cause of action associated with Reg FD.82 Additionally, 
failure to publicly disclose does not alone create a cause of action 
under Rule 10b-5 which allows for civil liability.83 
II. IS IT GETTING COLD IN HERE?: THE FAILURES OF REG FD 
The investment community sinks or swims in the water of 
information on publicly and privately traded securities. For former 
Chairman Levitt, those with the better boats had a comparable 
advantage over individual investors who get swallowed up in these 
rapids. His solution, Reg FD, is to calm those waters, but in doing so, 
he is imposing a freeze that will have an adverse effect on all 
yachtsmen on the sea of investment.84 
A. Ambiguity  
The most glaring problem with Reg FD is the lack of a bright-line 
test for materiality with which corporate insiders can govern their 
disclosure policies. Although there is a loose definition of what is 
material, this is of no comfort to those officers forced to make 
literally hundreds of disclosures per year. The SEC gives some 
guidance as to examples of material information,85 but a non-
 
 82. Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket (CCH) at 
6-7 (Aug. 19, 2001); see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.102. 
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102. “No failure to make a public disclosure required solely by 
§ 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5 (17 CFR 240.10b-5) under the 
Securities Exchange Act.” Id. 
 84. See infra Part II, A-D.  
 85. The adoption release states: 
While it is not possible to create an exhaustive list, the following items are some types 
of information or events that should be reviewed carefully to determine whether they 
are material: (1) earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint 
ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or developments 
regarding customers or suppliers (e.g. the acquisition or loss of a contract); (4) changes 
in control or in management; (5) change in auditors or auditor notification that the 
issuer may no longer rely on an auditor’s audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer’s 
securities- e.g., defaults on senior securities, calls for securities for redemption, 
repurchase plans, stock splits or changes in dividends, changes to the rights of 
securities holders, public or private sales of additional securities; and (7) bankruptcies 
or receiverships. 
Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket (CCH) at 11 (Aug. 
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exhaustive list does not help those who expose themselves to possible 
litigation every time they speak to an analyst. 
Commissioner Unger cited this as one of her major objections to 
the regulation, and echoed the concern that this will have severely 
adverse effects on the flow of information to the marketplace.86 
Unlike Unger, the remainder of the SEC, seems to disregard the 
possible issuer frustrations with this Reg FD.87  
If the SEC appears skeptical about the feasibility of Reg FD, their 
hesitation pales in comparison to the legal and professional investing 
community’s criticism. Both sectors are convinced that the ambiguity 
of Reg FD will create such paranoia in issuers that the running 
streams of information will permanently freeze.  
The professional investing community has been the most ardent 
critic of Reg FD. This criticism is to be expected because Reg FD 
further restricts the community’s access to information and limits 
their exploitation of the personal ties they developed with issuers 
over the years. Although these comments must be viewed skeptically, 
that community does have a unique perspective on the probable 
effects of the Regulation. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. sided with 
Commissioner Unger in stating that Reg FD will be absolutely 
counterproductive in its goal of providing fair information access to 
the public due to the ambiguity of many terms in Reg FD, most 
 
15, 2001). 
 86. The Securities Regulation and Law Report wrote at the passage of  Reg FD: 
Unger–who voted in December 1999 to issue the rule proposal despite misgivings–
continued to object, questioning whether new Regulation FD “will . . . provide the 
information investors really want.” Saying “parity of information is not the same as 
integrity of information,” she told BNA that in her view, “the rule is broader than the 
problem.” Unger, the sole Republican commissioner among three Democrats, also 
commented that “putting myself in the shoes of corporate management, I would not be 
sure what is or is not material.” 
Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, supra note 15. 
 87. The adoption release states: 
While we acknowledged in the Proposing Release that materiality judgments can be 
difficult, we do not believe an appropriate answer to this difficulty is to set forth a 
bright-line test, or an exclusive list of “material” items for purposes of Regulation 
FD . . . . [T]he general materiality standard has always been understood to encompass 
the necessary flexibility to fit the circumstances of each case.  
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket (CCH) at 
10-11 (Aug. 15, 2001). 
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importantly “materiality.”88  
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. is also concerned with the ambiguity 
of Reg FD, but it applauds the general effort.89 It realizes that there 
are disparities in information and that equal information for all could 
mean more efficient markets. Schwab states, however, that without 
clarification, Reg FD will push issuers into a paranoia that will chill 
the information flow.90  
On the legal side, Sullivan & Cromwell, one of the largest New 
York securities law firms, was particularly critical of Reg FD in its 
comment letter to the SEC. It sees Reg FD as imposing another layer 
of regulation that will merely cloud the well-reasoned decision in 
Dirks.91 Stephen Shulte, on behalf of the New York Bar Association, 
wrote that the burdensome nature of determining what is “material” 
 
 88. Merrill Lynch writes: 
Our fundamental concern with Regulation FD is its overwhelming reliance on 
“materiality,” a concept that can only be defined in general terms as something that a 
reasonable investor would want to know. The fact is that few lawyers will even opine 
on materiality issues that come up in informal communications between issuers and 
analysts because different lawyers, judges, juries, and regulators will apply the 
standard differently in similar circumstances . . . . The amorphous nature of materiality 
judgments was a major part of the reason that the Supreme Court in Dirks rejected the 
Commission’s proposed standard for insider trading liability, and insisted that to avoid 
deterring valuable communications between issuers and analysts, the SEC must find 
not only materiality but also that the insider had disclosed the information for an 
improper purpose. 
Comment Letter from Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to, Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (May 5, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/ 
morales1.htm. 
 89. See Comment Letter from Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. to Jonthan Katz, Secretary of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 20, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules 
/proposed /s73199/callcot1.htm. 
 90. Id. 
 91. The comment letter states: 
We are, therefore, concerned that the Commission’s initiative to implement . . . an 
immediate public disclosure requirement . . . . [It] will serve only to reimpose on 
issuers, analysts and investors the same uncertainties about line-drawing that prevailed 
prior to Dirks, and this uncertainty may substantially constrict the flow of information 
to the public to the detriment of investors. The parity of information sought by the 
Commission may in fact become a parity of non-information (or perhaps even of 
misinformation). 
Comment Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the Securities 
Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/ 
sulcromz.htm. 
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will prevent much information from ever getting to the public.92 
Another attorney, Donald Meiers, warned that a general 
unwillingness of issuers to speak to the press will exacerbate this 
chilling of information.93 As a result, Reg FD’s ambiguity will chill 
the speech of issuers. The costs of this regulation are magnified by 
the fact that it is not only the business world that is terrified of it, but 
also the lawyers who advise on compliance. 
So the brokerage houses, analysts, and lawyers are concerned 
about Reg FD’s ambiguous language chilling the speech of corporate 
insiders. These parties, however, are not Reg FD’s target. Rather, 
Reg FD is directed at corporations, and a survey taken soon after Reg 
 
 92. He writes: 
Under Regulation FD, private discussions with analysts . . . would become impractical 
from a compliance standpoint. An issuer would need to evaluate each and every 
discussion both before it took place, to assure that the issuer’s representative would be 
adequately prepared to avoid what could be argued was an intentional material 
nonpublic disclosure, and after it took place, to evaluate whether any non-intentional 
material nonpublic disclosure was made and, if so, issue a prompt public disclosure. 
Compliance problems would be particularly burdensome in light of what we believe is 
an overly broad definition of “person acting on behalf of an issuer.” By encompassing 
any officer, director, employee or agent . . . the Regulation would create an unwieldy 
compliance problem for large issuers. 
Comment Letter from Steven Shulte on behalf of the New York Bar Association to Jonathan 
Katz, Secretary of the Securities Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 2000), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/ proposed/s73199/schulte1.htm. 
 93. Rachel Witmer, Lawyer Suggests Efrects Regulation FD Might Have on Media, 32 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1485 (Oct. 30, 2001). Rachel Witmer reports that a combination of 
factors will limit the media’s access to corporate information: 
the media’s access to authorized company spokespersons will likely be more limited, 
as companies limit the number of such spokespersons; 
members of the media might be treated as if they were analysts or other persons 
covered by Regulation FD to cover the risk, for example, that an analyst is present at a 
press briefing; 
local media outlets might receive less information from corporate officials, as 
companies seek to make the broad “public disclosure” specified in the rule; 
members of the print media – which cannot effect simultaneous public disclosure – 
might receive less information from corporate officials than prior to Regulation FD; 
and 
generally, corporations will try to exert more control over getting their message out, by 
seeking to control more closely the content and timing of its publication in the media. 
They might also put more reliance on their own communications, such as broadcast e-
mails, than on speaking through the media. 
Id.  
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FD’s proposal found that 42% of corporate investor relations officials 
would limit communications!94  
Admittedly, when the large brokerage houses voice opposition to 
a regulation that directly affects their ability to get information to the 
public and, more importantly, industry cronies, the criticism is fairly 
biased. Conversely, when the law firms who stand to benefit from 
Reg FD in the form of increased compliance costs and possible 
litigation speak out against its language, the signal is clear. A primary 
function of a lawyer is to interpret regulations and statutes, and if the 
best law firms in the country see problematic language, changes are 
due. 
B. Unrealistic 
Reg FD fails to accept the twin realities of selective disclosure: (1) 
selective disclosure is an important avenue for information to get to 
the public; and (2) many issuers who are dependent upon powerful 
analysts will have to give good information for favorable reports.  
The SEC made great strides in getting regular reports to the public 
in its EDGAR95 database; however, much information is still leaked 
to the public through the thousands of analysts and brokers that take 
the time to develop personal contacts with corporate insiders. The 
most notable example of this leak is the analyst’s research report on 
corporations. Information in these reports is oftentimes gained 
through selective disclosure. The SEC’s heavy-handed reasoning that 
public disclosure is possible or advantageous in all situations is 
fundamentally flawed.96 Due to the crucial function of analyst reports 
 
 94. A survey of 462 corporate investor relations officials indicated that 42% would 
probably limit their communications if the proposed rule were adopted. SEC Outlaws Selective 
Disclosure Over Brokerage House Objections, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Aug. 11, 2000, at A7. 
 95. The Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) is a database of all SEC 
filings and can be accessed via the SEC Web site. See http://www.sec.gov (last visited Sept. 9, 
2001); http://www. freeedgar.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).  
 96. Note that the SEC has a tradition of underestimating the importance of the analyst vis-
à-vis its own regulations. Homer Kripke, in his work outlining the several flaws of the SEC, 
writes: 
Although the view of the statute is that the ordinary prospective investor can make an 
intelligent investment decision from a prospectus, the staff has shown over the years 
that it does not really believe this. On the contrary, the staff feels bound to do the 
investor’s thinking and verifying for him. This in practice has meant filtering out 
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in the public’s information gathering process, crippling the analyst’s 
ability to gain information will in fact hurt the group the SEC is 
trying to assist—the public. 
Probably, the most important feature of an analyst’s research 
report is the earnings forecast for the next few quarters. In the past, 
either privately or during conference calls, firms leaked information 
to analysts who then create an accurate earnings forecast for the 
public. This disclosure cushions the impact of earnings reports by 
forewarning investors of any surprises before the issuer announces 
them. However, with Reg FD, issuers may not transmit this 
information to analysts and no warnings can be given. The market 
reflects the consequences of Reg FD in all sectors, from Cisco in the 
tech sector97 to Alcoa in heavy industry.98  
 
everything but the objective facts, as if the investor could not focus a suitable 
skepticism on estimates of value or projections of future earnings . . . .  
 On the other hand, the SEC overestimates the average investor’s ability to master the 
complexities of the financial picture of the typical issuer . . . , and therefore has failed 
. . . at least until recently to understand that [this information] can be used only 
effectively by professionals. 
HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 14 (1979). 
 97. The market saw the detrimental effects of the Reg FD prohibitions in the early months 
of 2001. Cisco Systems is a heavily traded tech stock on the NASDAQ market under the ticker 
symbol CSCO. Cisco released its second quarter earnings after trading ended on February 6, 
2001. Cisco reported earnings per share of $0.12 per share versus $0.11 per share for the second 
quarter of 2000. Cisco Systems Reports Second Quarter Earnings, at http://newsroom.cisco. 
com/dlls/corp-020601.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). Although the figures were positive and 
Cisco made the earnings amidst multiple acquisitions that siphoned away capital, the figure 
missed analysts’ estimates by one penny per share. Id. The stock price reflected a negative and 
immediate response by the investing community. In after-hours trading on February 6, the stock 
price fell $1.86 to $33.86 after gaining $1.19 during that day’s trading hours before the figure 
was released. Carol Vinzant, Nasdaq Edges Up; Dow Gain is Erased, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 
2001, at E3.  
 On February 7, 2001, the stock dropped to 31.063 per share trading 281,548,700 shares! 
See http://www.nasdaq.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2002). The next largest volume figure traded on 
January 10, 2001, and it was almost 70 million shares less than the February 7 number. Id. To 
give one an idea of sheer amount of shares traded, over 11,172 shares changed hands every 
second on February 7, 2001! This kind of volatility is not good for any investor, institutional, or 
individual.  
 98. Analysis speculate that Alcoa’s concern about complying with ‘fair disclosure’ 
regulations caused the company to cease providing guidance in earnings forecasts. The 
company’s stock fell 10% on the news that earnings would fall short of expectations after being 
on target for the prior eight years. Robert McGough, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effects of ‘Fair 
Disclosure’ Rule–Clamming Up? Some See Alcoa Adopting the Silent Treatment, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 23, 2000, at C1. 
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This blindness to the essential place of selective disclosure in the 
analyst’s research has another side. Contrary to the SEC’s position,99 
Reg FD disregards the fact that many corporate insiders are beholden 
to analysts that follow them for positive and thorough reports. 
Therefore, corporate insiders are put in a difficult position when they 
are forced to choose between violating Reg FD and compromising 
the welfare of the security on the market.100 Hence, compliance with 
Reg FD may entail too great a cost for the corporate insiders of many 
smaller publicly traded corporations, and in looking out for the best 
interests of the corporation, they may choose to violate the regulation. 
Lastly, this regulation ignores the fact that many forms of 
selective disclosure will be nearly impossible to detect. Technically, a 
mere gesture may be selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information, but if it occurs between two people in the basement of a 
building, no one will know.101 Without insider trading, there is no real 
evidence unless someone will voluntarily testify, which is highly 
unlikely due to possible self-incrimination. 
C. Inconsistent with Prior SEC Policy  
The SEC always stresses that all investors should be placed on an 
equal footing, but it never admits that there should be the “parity of 
information” that Reg FD mandates. In fact, the Supreme Court in 
Dirks reiterated the then–current SEC view that absolute equality of 
information is untenable and unhealthy for the markets.102 
 
 99. See supra notes 43 & 44. 
 100. At a D.C. panel discussing the compliance aspects of Reg FD, many lawyers insisted 
that because the penalty is on the issuer, the analysts would still attempt to use connections to 
get information. Roger Patterson, a lawyer for Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering stated, “Analysts are 
going to continue to put pressure on issuers to get the information they need.” Rachel Witmer, 
Despite SEC Disclosure Rule, Lawyer Says, Analsysts, Firm Officials Will Talk One-On-One, 
32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1452, M53 (Oct. 23, 2000). 
 101. At the same D.C. Bar Association panel Manny Strauss, Associate General Counsel 
for Columbia Energy Group, stated that “[a]lthough it will be more risky for public companies’ 
officials to speak one-on-one with securities industry analysts once [Reg FD] goes into effect 
. . ., such communications are not likely to disappear.” Id. He went on to say, “‘I just don’t see 
one-on-ones disappearing. I think the risk associated with them is increasing.’” Id. 
 102. 463 U.S. at 646, 658 (1983). The Court states: 
The SEC expressly recognized that “[the] value to the entire market of [analysts’] 
efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by 
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Chairwoman Unger, in her dissent to the Reg FD echoed this concern 
over the inconsistency with prior policy.103 In addition to the 
Commissioner, but also the group that represents the industry 
professionals, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), expresses 
the same concern.104 
D. Conclusion: A Fine Balance? 
In the adoption of Reg FD, the SEC stated that “Regulation FD 
strikes an appropriate balance.”105 In its opinion, the possible benefits 
of Reg FD more than offset the costs; however, it is evident that the 
SEC misjudged both the high costs and nearly non-existent 
benefits.106  
 
[their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work 
redounds to the benefit of all investors.” 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1406. The SEC asserts 
that analysts remain free to obtain from management corporate information for 
purposes of “filling in the ‘intersticas in analysis’ . . . .” 
Id. at 659 n17. 
 103. Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, supra note 15. 
Commissioner Unger questioned whether Regulation FD would provide the information 
investors really want saying “parity of information is not the same as integrity of information,” 
and that “the rule is broader than the problem.” Id. 
 104. “In its April 6 letter, SIA maintained that neither the 1933 Securities Act nor the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act ‘contemplates the unattainable goal of parity of access to all material 
information relevant to the issuer that is available anyplace outside the issuer.’” SIA Says SEC 
Proposal to Stem Leaks to Analysts Cannot Work As Intended, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
532 (Apr. 24, 2000). 
 105. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 73 SEC Docket 
(CCH) at 7 (Aug. 15, 2001). 
 106. The problems with Reg FD can be summarized in the closing remarks of a 1977 
address by Dean Manning to the American Bar Association: 
 To declare a law is very cheap; to administer or enforce a law is very expensive. 
 The secondary costs of a law are often greater than the direct costs. 
 The capacity of law to change human behavior is very limited. 
 Even where a law may effectively achieve its primary purpose, the side effects may 
be too great and too negative to permit or warrant its adoption. 
 Many problems are not amenable to legal solutions at all. 
 . . . Our legislators, judges, administrators and the public—all of us—must come to 
understand that law is in fact an instrument of limited utility, is always accompanied 
by significant, and frequently harmful, side effects, and that it is very expensive . . . .  
KRIPKE, supra note 96, at xvi. 
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III. PROPOSAL: BREAK THE ICE PACK 
No one argues that former Chairman Levitt’s intentions with Reg 
FD were not genuine and well-founded. Theoretically, equal access 
to information may be a good thing. The fears of acting Chairwoman 
Unger, however, are more meritorious. Part II of this Note analyzed 
the severe drawbacks of Reg FD. Ambiguity, almost willful blindness 
to reality and inconsistency with prior SEC policy comprise a very 
strong case against Reg FD as it stands. The solution to this is simple: 
rescission of Reg FD. 
Two variables point to this solution. First, Arthur Levitt, the 
former SEC Chairman that championed Reg FD, is gone. Former 
Chairman Levitt stepped down from his position on February 9, 
2001.107 As the longest reigning SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt guided 
the SEC through the securities markets’ recent explosive growth.108 
His long reign and success, however, do not excuse the deficiencies 
in Reg FD. The acting SEC Chairwoman, Laura Unger,109 was a 
staunch opponent of the Reg FD during its passage.110 She will be an 
able lieutenant to incoming Chairman Harvey Pitt111 whom, at his 
confirmation hearing, emphasized his belief in less regulation of the 
securities markets.112 Additionally, with respect to Reg FD 
 
 107. Securities and Exchange Commission: Bush Designates SEC’s Unger Acting 
Chairman of Commission, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 237 (Feb. 19, 2001). 
 108. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt to Step Down Before Mid-February, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1741 (Dec. 25, 2000). Arthur Levitt served the country well for over nearly 8 
years, being appointed in July 1993. Former President Clinton expressed his appreciation: 
“This time of unprecedented growth has brought new and unique challenges to 
America’s markets, and Arthur Levitt led the SEC’s response to the forces of 
technology, competition, and globalization,” Clinton stated. “America’s capital 
markets and its investors have benefited significantly from Chairman Levitt’s enduring 
vision, judicious oversight, and abiding sense of fair play,” the President related. 
Id. 
 109. February 12, 2001, President Bush named Unger as the acting Chairman of the SEC 
until he nominates and the Senate confirms the permanent Chairman. Securities and Exchange 
Commission: Bush Designates SEC’s Unger Acting Chairman of Commission, supra note 107.  
 110. See Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, supra note 15. 
 111. The Senate confirmed Chairman Pitt’s nomination on August 2, 2001; however, he 
has yet to take over from acting Chairman Unger. S.E.C. Chief Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2001, at C4. 
 112. Id. “He said securities laws must be reviewed because many . . . impose an unfair 
burden on market participants.” Id. 
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specifically, he stated that he “‘might have suggested changes or 
taken a different approach’ if he’d been involved in writing the 
rule.”113 Aiding these two with a plan of deregulation is the 
retirement of liberal Democrat Norman Johnson.114 The retirement 
leaves two slots vacant ready for Commissioners who share Unger’s 
and Pitt’s more conservative view. 
Second, not only is the political climate ripe for rescission of Reg 
FD, but the regulatory landscape does not necessitate Reg FD. The 
SEC adopted Reg FD to regulate supply rather than demand as a 
compliment to the well-established and constantly evolving breadth 
of insider trading law. In fact, adopted with Reg FD were two new 
rules to fill in the case law created gaps of Rule 10b-5.115 The genius 
of Rule 10b-5 is that it regulates the demand for material nonpublic 
information by punishing the detrimental use of it in insider trading. 
By allowing for the transfer of information without fear on the 
issuer’s part, the rivers of information can flow unimpeded.  
IV. CONCLUSION: WARMER DAYS AHEAD 
Former Chairman Levitt led the SEC through its most exciting 
times and helped it adapt to the changing economic landscape. Still, 
the passage of Reg FD was a mistake. With Chairman Pitt at the helm 
of the SEC and Laura Unger supporting him, the time is right rescind 
Reg FD. Its rescission will allow analysts access to information they 
deserve as market professionals, and it will give corporate insiders 
peace of mind. The most important outcome will be the 
transformation of information ice into information water powering 
the “hydro-economic” machine known as capital markets. 
 
 113. SEC Nominee Looking at Changing Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 20, 2001, at 55. 
 114. See Securities and Exchange Commission: Bush Designates SEC’s Unger Acting 
Chairman of Commission, supra note 107. 
 115. See supra notes 66 & 67. 
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